Behind the "decentralization" stands a founder with special rights.
The founder (Artur Arakelyan) has no special rights - a known name is named in the documents as a risk factor, not a privilege. The single organ of decision is the DAO Assembly (all verified Earthlings). A transition period is under way, but even in it the founders cannot amend the Declaration, deprive anyone of status, spend resources for personal ends or block decentralization; their powers only narrow.
Direct democracy = the tyranny of a 51% majority.
A part of the rights is placed beyond any vote: the immutable core of the Declaration cannot be repealed even unanimously. The aim of the design is to scatter power so that it accumulates with no one, the majority included. Membership is inalienable, and for decisions that affect minorities there are raised thresholds and additional mechanisms for taking their interests into account.
What stops a narrow group (whales, the tech team) from seizing the wheel?
A master is always accumulation; remove the accumulability of decisive force and there is nothing from which to assemble a master. The vote is bound one-to-one to a living verified person; it is not bought and not derived from money, reputation or office; the foundations are placed beyond votes. Instead of a guardian (who would himself become a master) there is open, reproducible code and the right to leave: a captured design the people abandon, and the payoff from capture falls. The residue left unclosed - the infrastructure layer (keys, servers) - is named honestly and is limited by transparency and the right to leave.
"One person, one vote" is easy to assert. Technically it is unprovable.
The vote is bound to a biometrically confirmed earthling through a non-transferable SBT passport (the Polygon blockchain, a publicly verifiable contract). Biometric uniqueness and a liveness check cut off second accounts, bots and deepfakes; an irreversible hash makes it impossible to register twice. Neither reputation, nor volume of tokens, nor delegation adds weight - the principle is absolute.
An Independent Council of experts is a shadow senate that really runs things.
The Council is strictly advisory: its opinions are recommendatory only, it cannot block DAO decisions, has no right of veto and takes no part in finances. Its strength is in reputation, not in powers. And it is not yet formed: this is a meta-institution under design, not a functioning organ.
A participant can be expelled, or a dissenter squeezed out.
No. Membership is inalienable: no one can be expelled from the people under any circumstances; leaving is by one's own will alone. In cases of violation, graduated restrictions on access to services apply (six levels, with a right to a defense and to appeal through the DAO), but they concern access, not belonging to the people.
On paper a "pure DAO", but in practice ministers and factions will appear.
By design there are no parties, offices or executive organs. There are only service technical structures with no right to decide: Core Nodes (coordination, up to 6 people, 6-month rotation) and Emergency Multisig (urgent security, a limit of 5000 EC, DAO ratification within 7 days), both revocable by vote. Only people vote, in person; cells, legal entities and any structures have no collective vote.
If the design ossifies or is captured, the participant is trapped.
Exit is unconditional and requires no explanation. The code is open and reproducible: people move to an uncaptured version. A lawful continuation is recognized not by a copy of the code but by three unforgeable marks - the immutable core preserved, the will of verified people (one person, one vote) and the continuity of procedures; legitimacy is carried by people, not by servers and a repository.